




**U.S. Army Deception Planning
at the
Operational Level of War**

**A Monograph
by
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Armor**



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ABSTRACT

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This monograph discusses operational deception planning in the U.S. Army . A common misconception is that modern technology precludes effective deception above the tactical level. Technology such as satellite surveillance may increase the difficulty of operational deception planning, but it does not obviate the need for such planning. Too frequently, however, deception plans are constructed as afterthoughts to the overall operations plan. As a result, they are frequently unrealistic and ineffective. In that light, this monograph examines deception at the operational level of war and proposes recommendations to effectively plan deception at that level.

The monograph first examines the deception theories of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Basil Henry Liddell Hart. Next, the monograph uses history to determine which of these theories, if any, are evident in previous campaigns. This paper studies Napoleon's use of the reserve cavalry corps during the Ulm campaign in 1805, Operation Mincemeat (Sicily 1943), Operation Fortitude (Normandy 1944), and the Egyptian Army crossing the Suez canal in 1973. The monograph then scrutinizes current U.S. Army deception doctrine in order to establish the baseline of our deception planning.

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INTRODUCTION

Dawn. The first rays of light streamed over the mountains. Momentarily, the sun's strength would increase and warm the soldiers chilled by the cool night air of the desert. The previous evening, their commander assembled these five thousand men and ordered them to set up an ambush behind the city of Ai. Now, as the sun rose over the Negev desert, the soldiers removed their cloaks and prepared for battle. To the north of Ai lay a valley, beyond which Joshua assembled the remaining twenty five thousand soldiers of the Israelite Army. His battle plan was simple:

I and all those with me will advance on the city, and when the men come out against us, as they did before, we will flee from them. They will pursue us until we have lured them away from the city, for they will say, 'They are running away from us as they did before.' So when we flee from them, you (the five thousand) are to rise up from ambush and take the city.¹

Watching his opponents march out of the valley, the King of Ai formed his troops for the destruction of Israel. As the soldiers of Ai marched out of the city, Joshua's men slowly withdrew and then fled toward the desert.

After being signalled by Joshua, the ambush force west of Ai left its hide position and quickly captured the undefended stronghold. The King of Ai realized that he had been duped, yet he was powerless to save his city. The Israelite Army counter-marched and attacked its pursuers, now trapped between two forces. The city and army of Ai were destroyed.²

Joshua's stratagem—history's first recorded deception plan—succeeded. By achieving his operational objectives, Jericho and Ai, Joshua laid the foundation for attaining his strategic goal, the conquest of Canaan. Succeeding generations have found deception equally useful.

The use of deception to achieve operational ends remains viable today. In an age of satellite technology, however, the question arises: How can the U.S.

Army's operational deception planning be enhanced to improve its chances for successful execution? Has deception at the operational level of war become too problematic and resource intensive to be worthwhile? Technology may increase the difficulty of operational deception planning, but it does not obviate the need for such planning. Few planners argue the *value* of deception—only that it is too *difficult* at the operational level of war. This monograph will examine operational deception and propose recommendations to make its planning less difficult. I will evaluate U.S. Army operational deception planning by using the following criteria:

- A. Does the planning process employ centralized control and coordination?
- B. Is preparation thorough?
- C. Is the deception plan logical?
- D. Does the plan confirm suspicions already present in the enemy's mind?
- E. Does the deception plan target the enemy decision maker?
- F. Is security maintained during the planning process?

Doctrine is derived from theory; therefore, a survey of the works of prominent theorists offers a suitable starting point for this study. The monograph will examine deception theories espoused by Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Basil Henry Liddell Hart. The purpose is to determine which theoretical deception principles are reflected in our current doctrine and which, if incorporated, could prove beneficial to our planning process.

History offers valuable insight into the deception plans of past battlefield commanders and their applicability to future crises. This paper will study Napoleon's use of deception in the Ulm campaign, 1805; Operation Mincemeat in Sicily, 1943; Operation Fortitude at Normandy, 1944; and the Egyptian Army

crossing the Suez canal in 1973. Although deception planning was employed in recent operations such as Just Cause and the Iran - Iraq war, the information remains classified and will not be examined in this monograph.

Current U.S. Army doctrine will be scrutinized to determine how operational deception is currently planned. We will concentrate on FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, as the baseline of our deception doctrine. FM 100-5, Operations, as the U.S. Army's doctrine for the conduct of war, will also be studied. Currently, there is no joint deception doctrine. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication (JCS PUB) 3-58, Deception Operations, is planned, but not presently under development.

Many analysts agree that operational deception, while difficult, is still viable if thoughtfully planned. The requirements for operational deception planning will be viewed through the eyes of Michael Handel, Dennis Wheatley, Charles Cruickshank, and Michael Dewar. It should be noted that each of these men has either participated in the planning of operational deception during wartime or has conducted extensive study on the subject.

Having studied deception through theory, history, and doctrine, this essay will propose recommendations to enhance deception planning at the operational level of war. Joshua's stratagem at Ai was brilliant, simple, and effective. Our own deception planning can be equally successful.

A LOOK AT THEORY

Theory, by definition, is speculation.³ It is a set of hypotheses developed for a specific study or environment, although its applications are sometimes valid for other studies. Many theoretical tenets are reflected in our current deception doctrine; others, if incorporated, could prove beneficial.

Historians have long questioned the existence of Sun Tzu and the authorship of The Art of War. Did Sun Tzu actually live? Was he a sophist, in the person of a strategist, who roamed China in search of patronage? If so, did he write The Art of War? These questions, like similar ones concerning William Shakespeare, will probably never be answered to everyone's satisfaction. Of significance is that, regardless of authorship, the adages contained in The Art of War are as relevant today as they were 2500 years ago. In this century alone, the principles of Sun Tzu were effectively practiced by Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh, to name but two.

To Sun Tzu, deception was the foundation for all warfare because it facilitated the enemy's demise without battle.⁴ Mao, inadequately manned and equipped in his struggle against Chiang Kai-Shek, also emphasized the value of deception.⁵ Deception is made possible by effective intelligence. The concept is to deprive the enemy of the initiative by hiding your size, dispositions, and intentions. Successful deception, according to Sun Tzu, depended on mastering the techniques of simulation and dissimulation.⁶ He stated that "although the enemy be numerous, if he does not know my military situation, I can always make him urgently attend to his own preparations so that he has no leisure to plan to fight me."⁷ All planning begins with an analysis of the enemy. An unclear picture of the enemy situation forces a commander to react to enemy activity instead of planning operations to seize the initiative. Mao argued that, in addition to making a commander react to enemy designs, deception leads him to make

unwise decisions and take erroneous actions.⁸ The concepts of denying the initiative and creating a state of uncertainty in the enemy's mind are ideas that imply centralized control and coordination.

Uncertainty is created when the enemy doubts your intentions. A unit's intentions are the result of a coordinated campaign plan based on the commander's intent or purpose. Centralized control and coordination are essential because a deception plan requires multiple organizations for proper execution. The result of such centralized control and coordination is the ability "when near, (to) make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near."⁹ To be effective, such movement requires synchronization and integration of both the operations plan and the deception plan.¹⁰ This again necessitates centralized control and coordination.

Having devised a control apparatus for the deception plan, Sun Tzu continued his discussion of planning stratagem. "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."¹¹ Intelligence of this nature comes from thorough preparation. The deception plan cannot be developed as an ancillary operation, nor can it be created for its own sake without any operational purpose. It requires, as Sun Tzu understood, the same meticulous preparation as any other portion of a campaign plan.

Part of the preparation includes the target of the deception, the individual that the deception plan is intended to deceive. Sun Tzu left no doubt that the target should be the enemy commander or decision maker. It is necessary to disrupt the decision maker's thought process and force him to doubt his preferred course of action.¹² No other individual is capable of redirecting policy.

After determining the deception target, Sun Tzu turned to the means available to implement deception. Sun Tzu encouraged the deceiver to foster disunity in the enemy camp and disrupt enemy alliances.¹³ He further advocated the use of

secret agents for the purpose of fostering distrust among allies.¹⁴ Another method suggested by Sun Tzu was to confirm suspicions already present in the enemy's mind. This was the method used first by Joshua at Ai. Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of this tenet by writing, "now the crux of military operations lies in the pretence of accommodating one's self to the designs of the enemy."¹⁵ He clearly understood the potential gain to be derived from inflating the ego of the enemy commander. When supremely overconfident, the enemy is less likely to pay meticulous attention to detail and more likely to commit a rash act.

Coordination, preparation, and targeting are dependent on security. Security gives a commander freedom of maneuver and allows the enemy to be defeated in detail.¹⁶ Security encompassed the entirety of Sun Tzu's deception planning. Deception to Sun Tzu was far more than an auxiliary operation. "Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move."¹⁷ Over two millennium later, a British theorist echoed many of the same ideas.

Basil Henry Liddell Hart was a military critic whose intellectual maturation was profoundly shaped by the devastation of World War I. He agreed with many of Sun Tzu's tenets for effective deception planning and used history to buttress his argument.

Central to Liddell Hart's deception theories were the concepts of denying the enemy his freedom of action and confusing the enemy decision maker. These, he felt, were psychological elements that would deprive the enemy of the initiative.¹⁸ The desired effect was the disruption of the enemy's plans and the dislocation of his troop dispositions.¹⁹ Dislocation of an opponent's disposition is accomplished by the integration of deception into the operations plan. Integrated planning and synchronized execution are the products of centralized

control and coordination. In this area, Liddell Hart mimicked Sun Tzu. He also agreed with Sun Tzu concerning two other aspects of deception.

In Liddell Hart's mind, deception must be targeted at the enemy commander.²⁰ It is the commander who determines unit dispositions and envisions the theater of operations. The commander develops a mental picture of lines of operation and support. He also determines his unit's acceptable level of risk and the benefits to be derived from that risk. Given Liddell Hart's emphasis on dislocating enemy dispositions, it follows that the deception target is the individual best positioned to affect dislocation.

The other area where Liddell Hart agreed with Sun Tzu was that of confirming the enemy's preconceived notions. Liddell Hart illustrated this by recounting Germany's shocking Ardennes offensive in 1944. He noted that the Germans successfully slowed the Allied advance during the autumn of 1944. This should have given the Allies pause to consider the likelihood of a German offensive. Expectations of quick victory influenced Allied planning, which did not seriously consider the possibility of a German counter-offensive. The Germans succeeded in reinforcing the Allied notion that an enemy assault was highly unlikely. They further succeeded in attacking in the area least expected by the Allies.²¹

In some aspects, Liddell Hart went beyond Sun Tzu. He understood that for deception to influence the enemy commander, it must go beyond reinforcing his suspicions. The plan must also be logical. It must contain enough truth to be believable.²²

Liddell Hart advocated the use of alternative objectives as a means of influencing enemy dispositions.²³ He recognized that the operations planning process entailed the development of multiple courses of action, as well as branches to account for the friction inherent in war. Liddell Hart reasoned that

since the branches were already developed, why not use one of them as the deception plan?

Although many tenets of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart are similar, they diverge from each other on the following point: Sun Tzu felt that "...war is based on deception" ²⁴, whereas Liddell Hart declared that "...time and surprise are the two most vital elements of war." ²⁵ This view does not contradict Sun Tzu; rather, it reflects Liddell Hart's position that deception is a subset of a greater entity, that of surprise.

The value of surprise was but one of many areas of disagreement between Liddell Hart and the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, a military theorist from the Napoleonic era. Because the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz are reflected, to a large degree, in the U.S. Army's wartime doctrine, it is important to examine his tenets concerning deception. In On War, Clausewitz addresses the subject of deception in his discussion of surprise. Although he believes that surprise is fundamental to all operations, Clausewitz declares that "surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. Basically surprise is a tactical device...cases in which such surprises led to major results are very rare." ²⁶ To Clausewitz, surprise is important, but a plan's success should not be based on it because there are too many variables. The concept of friction would prevent surprise, like other components of a plan, from being executed as designed.

Clausewitz' suspicion of surprise carried over to his thoughts on deception. He felt that deception was too timely, too costly and should be used only as a last resort.

To prepare a sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an enemy requires a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with the scale of the deception. Normally they call for more than can be spared, and consequently so-called strategic feints rarely have the desired effect." ²⁷

As we shall see, history later proved his last sentence wrong. That, however, does not invalidate his concerns; quite the contrary, for Clausewitz' caution on thoroughness reflects Sun Tzu's admonition about thorough preparation of a deception plan. It is equally important to note that Clausewitz' skepticism concerning deception did not prevent him from discussing cogent ideas on the subject.

Like Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart, the writings of Clausewitz indicate that the target of any deception effort must be the enemy commander. According to Clausewitz, surprise fosters disunity and creates a situation where one individual's actions may have significant repercussions for the entire unit.²⁸ Clausewitz understood that planting the seeds of doubt in the mind of the enemy commander may cause the enemy to hesitate before pursuing his chosen course of action.

To Clausewitz, surprise was the result of secrecy and speed.²⁹ This is in agreement with Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart concerning the necessity of security in deception operations. As an operation grows, it encompasses more units and secrecy is harder to maintain. It also becomes more difficult to execute the deception plan quickly enough to ensure success. This, in part, may explain Clausewitz' caution concerning the use of deception above the tactical level. Despite his doubts, Clausewitz understood the value of a well planned and executed stratagem. "The use of a trick or stratagem permits the intended victim to make his own mistakes, which, combined in a single result, suddenly change the nature of the situation before his very eyes."³⁰

Let us review the major deception tenets advocated by Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, and Clausewitz. It is instructive to note that these three theorists represent different cultural backgrounds and different periods of history, yet many of their tenets are similar. All advocated thorough preparation as an essential ingredient

for success and all affirmed that the deception target should be the enemy commander or decision maker. Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart recognized the need for centralized control and coordination in the deception planning process, as well as the requirement to confirm suspicions already present in the enemy's mind. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz highlighted the importance of maintaining security throughout the planning and execution of the deception. Through his study of history, Liddell Hart emphasized the need for the deception plan to contain enough truth to appear logical to the enemy. Given the many generations and the variety of experiences that separate their writings, it is interesting that these three theorists, for the most part, complement each other. Even Clausewitz' skepticism is directed more at the *cost* of deception as opposed to its *worth*. We shall later see which of their thoughts are evident in history and which are incorporated in the U.S. Army's current deception doctrine.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

Will Durant, the historian, once wrote that "most history is guessing and the rest is prejudice...our conclusions from the past to the future are made more hazardous than ever by the acceleration of change." Continuing, however, he said "the present is the past rolled up for action, and the past is the present unrolled for understanding."³¹ History provides a glimpse of deception operations of the past. In an effort to understand the applicability of the past to the present and future, let us examine four historical examples of deception at the operational level of war.

The year 1805 witnessed the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte to his zenith. Having consolidated his power within France and crowning himself Emperor of the French, Napoleon concentrated on the destruction of external foes. In the autumn of that year Austria, Russia, and Great Britain formed an alliance known as the Third Coalition. Their goal was the defeat of Napoleon and the restoration of the territorial balance of Europe to its 1789 boundaries. It was, in short, a goal designed to contain French hegemony.³²

The "Grande Armée" of Napoleon spent much of 1805 in Brittany and Normandy, training for an invasion of England that never came. Recognizing the impracticability of invading Britain without adequate naval support and identifying an opportunity to crush Austria and Russia, Napoleon indefinitely postponed the invasion plan.³³ His objective became the complete destruction of the Third Coalition armies and the resulting extirpation of the national will of those countries.

French intelligence, using an elaborate semaphore system, notified Napoleon that the Austrian Army was marching west through Bavaria and Italy. They also reported that the Russian Army was several days behind the Austrians. With this information, Napoleon recognized an opportunity to defeat the Coalition

armies in detail. He saw the Danube river basin as the major theater of operations. The Coalition, based on Napoleon's previous campaigns, saw Italy as the theater of operations and thought that the "Grande Armée" would march through the Black Forest. Napoleon's goal was to reinforce that mistaken belief.

His plan demonstrated an understanding of Sun Tzu, who wrote:

Thus, march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before him...You may start after the enemy and arrive before him because you know how to estimate and calculate distances...He who wishes to snatch an advantage takes a devious and distant route and makes of it the short way...He deceives and fools the enemy to make him dilatory and lax, and then marches on speedily.³⁴

Napoleon decided to send the reserve cavalry corps commanded by his brother-in-law, Marshal Murat, into the Black Forest as a feint. Simultaneously, the remaining French forces would quickly march north of the Danube and attack the Austrians from the rear. Speed and surprise were critical to success and Napoleon's corps system facilitated the execution of his plan. Each corps was a self-contained force with the requisite infantry, artillery, and cavalry to engage in battle. Each corps advanced on a different axis and was within 1-2 day's march of another. One of the advantages of the corps system was Napoleon's ability to change the composition of major formations to deceive the enemy.³⁵ An opponent could identify a combined arms force, but could not precisely determine the type or size. Such meticulous attention to detail was in keeping with the dictums of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart concerning thorough preparation of deception plans.

Murat's cavalry corps was the bait for the Austrian Army. Based on the Coalition's mistaken deduction of the theater of operations, Napoleon positioned the cavalry to reinforce the Austrian commander's preconceived notion. Murat was masterful. He sallied forth into the Black Forest while General Mack, the

Austrian commander, reacted as if he were playing a scripted role. Mack, believing that the French were conforming to Coalition predictions, boldly pushed forward into the Black Forest. The geography of the area, when coupled with the French cavalry screen, prevented Mack from realizing that Napoleon was bearing down on him from the north. Napoleon wrote that "everything goes well here; the Austrians are in the Black Forest defiles; God will it that they stay there!"³⁶ Having confirmed the Austrian commander's suspicions, the French leader feared that Murat's diversion was so strong that it might actually scare away the Austrians. He need not have feared.

Napoleon's deception security was as thorough as the other aspects of his planning. Security measures included sealing the French frontiers to stop the flow of news and dispatching secret agents to search for suspected enemy agents and sympathizers. No mention of the "Grande Armée's" move was made in the press; even corps commanders remained ignorant of the deception.³⁷

Each of the theorists previously examined felt that thorough preparation was an essential component of successful deception. In planning the deception operation for the Ulm campaign, Napoleon exhibited meticulous attention to detail. The target of French deception was General Mack. Murat's feint reinforced the Coalition's preconceived, albeit mistaken, notion that the primary theater of operations was Italy. By controlling the press and limiting access to his plans, Napoleon effectively centralized the control and coordination of the deception operation and maintained stringent security. David Chandler, in The Campaigns of Napoleon, wrote that "Napoleon was a master of deception."³⁸ In his campaign against the Third Coalition, Napoleon justified that accolade.

In 1943, Adolf Hitler controlled much of the European continent once dominated by Napoleon. Following breathtaking victories in the initial campaigns of the war, the Axis powers of Germany and Italy found themselves under assault

on multiple fronts. The Soviets wrested the initiative from the Germans in the east, while British and American forces defeated the Axis armies in North Africa. Hitler anticipated an Allied invasion of the European continent as a follow-on to Anglo-American success in North Africa. The unknown element was the location of such an invasion. Would the Allies land in Sicily, Sardinia, or the Peloponnesus? Unknown to Hitler, the Allied leaders met at Casablanca in January, 1943, and selected Sicily as the objective. For the Allies, the question was how to deceive the fuhrer?

A British intelligence organization, MI 5, was given the lead in preparing a deception operation. Among the intentions of the deception was an attempt to portray Sardinia as the initial objective and Sicily as a subsequent objective. In this, they were aided by the fact that General Eisenhower, the Allied commander, *actually preferred* Sardinia to Sicily.³⁹ Combined, these factors presented a large degree of uncertainty to the German planners.

Hitler, however, betrayed no such uncertainty. His measure of Winston Churchill was that the British Prime Minister would invade the Peloponnesus in an attempt to compensate for the ill-fated Allied invasion at Gallipoli in World War I. The Fuhrer, therefore, was convinced that Allied planning centered on the Balkans.⁴⁰ Hitler, as the ultimate arbitrator of the Axis, became the target of the Allied deception plan.

To confirm the German leader's suspicion, MI 5 developed Operation Barclay, a deception suggesting an invasion of the Balkans. Barclay was designed to further reinforce Hitler's prediction while giving the Allies time to plan the primary deception for the invasion of Sicily. The picture painted by Barclay was a British landing at Crete and Greece, while Americans under Lieutenant General George Patton seized Sardinia and Corsica. Complementing Patton's invasion, General Sir Harold Alexander was to lead an Allied assault of southern France.⁴¹ The

plan played on Churchill's fascination with the Aegean and thus strengthened Hitler's conviction that the Balkans were the focal point of Allied planning. "The art of deception is to give your enemy something like what he wants to believe, so that he won't scrutinize the bait too closely."⁴² In this, the Allies were extremely successful.

Inasmuch as Operation Barclay reconfirmed Hitler's faith in himself, MI 5 had time to create Operation Mincemeat. Together, the two deception operations convinced Hitler of his infallibility as a military planner. Popularly known as "The Man Who Never Was," Operation Mincemeat was the creation of Lieutenant Commander Ewen Montagu, Royal Navy.⁴³ On 30 April 1943, the body of Major William Martin, Royal Marines, was loaded on the submarine HMS Seraph. Later, off the coast of Huelva, Spain, the corpse was dumped and washed ashore with the tide. Secured to the body were plans for an Allied invasion of Greece.⁴⁴

Thorough preparation was evident from the plan's detail. Along with miniscule items such as theater ticket stubs, Major Martin carried a letter from a high ranking British official to General Alexander discussing the invasion of Greece.⁴⁵ Major Martin was himself fictitious. MI 5 obtained the body of a man who succumbed to pneumonia, trusting that the water in Martin's lungs would convince the Axis that the officer had drowned. Throughout the planning process, the British attempted to determine how the Germans would react. It was vital that the operation reinforce *enemy* beliefs.⁴⁶ The Germans saw the situation just as the British hoped.

The operation was actually a double deception. The letter carried by Major Martin to General Alexander indicated that the British *wanted* the Germans to believe the target was Sicily. This led Hitler to reason that Sicily obviously could *not* be the actual target. The British planners had done their homework well.

Hitler was fooled and diverted the 1st Panzer Division from Sicily to the Peloponnesus. 47

What else contributed to the success of Operation Mincemeat? Liddell Hart emphasized the need for a deception plan to contain just enough truth to be logical. Mincemeat, while imaginative, was not farfetched. It was, in fact, based on an incident in 1942 in which a downed pilot's body washed ashore in Spain and was searched by the German "Abwehr" (military intelligence).48

Eisenhower's preference for Sardinia further enhanced, for the Germans, the credibility of Mincemeat. The Allies reinforced the plan by positioning dummy landing craft in Egypt and initiating air attacks against Greek targets prior to the Sicily D-Day.

Security was tight. The British Vice Consul in Huelva, Spain was not informed of the deception, nor was the commander of the HMS Seraph. Allied troops were even misled through the issue of Greek maps and language books.49 Coupled with security, the entire operation was controlled and coordinated between MI 5 and Churchill. Nothing was executed without his approval. 50

Throughout the entire operation, the Allies strove to confirm suspicions already present in the Axis minds. "...It was not so much the Allied deception measures that fooled the Germans but that they reinforced what the Germans themselves *already believed*."51

One year after the invasion of Sicily, the Allies were prepared for the long awaited invasion across the English Channel onto the European continent. As in Sicily, the Axis was certain of an invasion, but was again unsure of the location and date. The Allies, in planning their deception, turned to Sun Tzu:

The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a great many

places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in any one place will be few.⁵²

This idea became the paramount concern in the Allied planning process. Three deception operations were designed to spread out the already thin German forces: Operation Zeppelin planted yet another seed about an Allied invasion of the Balkans; Operation Fortitude North was to be an invasion of Scandinavia; Operation Fortitude South pointed to an invasion of France at the Pas de Calais.⁵³ Through the use of deception, the Allies hoped to pin down enemy units in three geographically dispersed areas, thus denying the Germans the ability to concentrate at Normandy, the actual landing site. Each of the plans was plausible and the Germans later admitted that the deception operations successfully tied down 90 divisions throughout Europe.⁵⁴

The objective of Fortitude South was to reinforce the German belief that the primary invasion site was the Pas de Calais, with Normandy being a secondary effort. This was logical since the Pas de Calais meant an Allied crossing at Dover Straits, the narrowest point of the English Channel. This brought the Allies to the problem of massing an invasion force, but keeping its location and destination secret.

To accomplish their goal, the Allies created the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) under Patton's command. News was then leaked to the Germans, but it was done in a manner that denied them a complete picture of the operation. The Allies leaked bits of data which they hoped would satisfy the Germans, yet also prevent them from discovering Allied intentions too soon. FUSAG was positioned directly across the Dover Straits from the Pas de Calais, increasing the German expectation for an invasion at that point.⁵⁵ By forcing the enemy to piece the plan together themselves, the Allied increased the likelihood that the Germans would give credence to the deception. Unknown to the Germans, as the two

armies comprising FUSAG (1st Canadian and 3rd American) were relocated to the actual assembly areas for Normandy, they were replaced by fictitious armies.

German misconceptions were encouraged by double agents who reported the fake build-up to Berlin. These agents often gave reports that matched the German hierarchy's own views. This accomplished, FUSAG became a reality to the German hierarchy.⁵⁶ To ensure that the Germans took the bait, Allied planners developed a series of support operations for Fortitude South. These were the Quicksilver operations: dummy landing craft and docks, decoy tanks and trucks, radio deception, and the bombing of the Pas de Calais.⁵⁷ Designed to deceive aerial reconnaissance, all the equipment was fake. Entire units were created from canvas, plywood, papier-mache and inflated rubber.⁵⁸ Simple? Yes, and very effective.

Because of things as simple as decoys, the Germans grossly inflated the size of the Allied invasion force. Hitler believed that as many as 97 divisions were in Britain. In reality, only 35 existed.⁵⁹ In the eyes of German planners, a force of almost 100 divisions posed a realistic invasion threat to the continent. For the Allies, such a force diverted attention from the real invasion force being built in southern England.

Because Hitler acted as his own intelligence chief and made virtually all military decisions, he was the deception target for Fortitude South.⁶⁰ The operation built on his idea that any invasion at Normandy was a secondary effort; the major assault would be at the Pas de Calais. So successful was Fortitude that by mid-day on 6 June, Hitler decided that the Normandy invasion was, indeed, the diversionary attack he had predicted all along.⁶¹ While reminding his staff of his prediction, Hitler kept his panzer divisions in the Pas de Calais until 11 June waiting for the major invasion. This decision allowed the Allies to land 152,000 troops at Normandy without a single massed counter-

attack.⁶² Fortitude South worked so well that "...two months after the Normandy landings they (Germans) would still believe the real invasion was yet to come."⁶³

Thus, the Allies targeted Hitler in Operation Fortitude South and developed a deception plan that reinforced what he wanted to believe. The fact that planning for Fortitude South began a year in advance of the invasion speaks well for its preparation. Additionally, Allied preparation displayed imagination. British planners dropped strips of aluminum foil from balloons and gliders to deceive German radar. The foil produced the same radar image as an airplane and convinced the Germans that an enormous air armada was enroute.⁶⁴

Equally well planned was the security that shrouded Fortitude South. The media wrote false editorials questioning the wisdom of so many foreign troops on British soil. This and similar disinformation was fed to German sources. The Allies recognized, however, the need for information to be believable and mixed fact with fiction to keep the Germans uncertain of the Allies' exact intentions. The rigid security began with Churchill and was carried through by the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower. "Eisenhower would go to any length to maintain security...He insisted on harsh punishment for anyone who violated security, and was good as his word."⁶⁵ This was evidenced when he demoted a West Point classmate from Major General to Colonel and shipped the man back to America. The violation? The individual discussed Operation Fortitude in a London Pub.⁶⁶

Following the dictums of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart concerning centralized command coordination, Fortitude South was controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and operated through the London Controlling Section (LCS). The LCS was a central agency that answered to only one person: Winston Churchill. The magnitude and importance of Fortitude South were evident to the British Prime Minister. The Allies had only one chance to succeed at Normandy. It was

essential that no confusion exist concerning the origination of deception missions. Churchill accepted that responsibility.

Deception operations require risk. Allied leaders weighed the risk of Fortitude South against the potential benefit and determined that success at Normandy hinged on deception. Any compromise of the deception plan could have been fatal to the Allies. Had the dummy portrayal of FUSAG been exposed or the aluminum strips been discovered, Hitler may have diverted many units from the Pas de Calais to the Normandy coast. It is a credit to the planners of Fortitude South that the operation did not collapse. Evident throughout the plan are the theories of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart pertaining to preparation, logic, security, and targets.

The views of these theorists are also apparent in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this conflict, Egypt developed a deception plan that was a classic lure predicated on the enemy's preconceived notions. Following its victory in the 1967 war, Israel felt secure. With the seizure of the Sinai peninsula, a buffer now existed between two foes. Adding to the security was the Suez Canal, a natural obstacle that precluded a massed surprise attack by the Egyptians.

Adding to Israeli confidence was their disregard, even disdain, for the Egyptian Army and its allies. Israel discounted the possibility of any coordinated effort between Egypt and either Syria or Iraq. "In 1973, Israeli commanders had convinced themselves on the evidence of post Arab-Israeli conflicts that the Arabs did not have either the physical or cultural qualities that are necessary to make effective soldiers."⁶⁷ It was that overconfidence that the Egyptians sought to exploit.

Planning for the 1973 war began the day the 1967 war ended. Anwar Sadat, upon becoming Egyptian President, decided that Arab victory in the next war would depend on a major deception operation.⁶⁸ In 1972-73, the Egyptian Army

conducted 40 water crossing exercises in full view of the Israeli forces along the Suez Canal. Initially, the Israelis mobilized for each exercise. This soon became impractical since most of the Israeli military is reserve and mobilization effectively shut down their economy. Additionally, Israel became convinced that the Egyptian exercises were nothing more than training events designed to goad the Israelis into useless mobilization.⁶⁹ The Egyptians furthered Israeli complacency by presenting troops who played soccer, fished in the canal, and generally appeared lazy.

Unknown to the Israelis, the Egyptians left some troops and equipment behind after every exercise. The Egyptian Army massed for an attack under the eyes of the Israeli forces, but the Israelis did not believe the evidence.

We looked on as Egypt prepared hundreds of roads up to Sweet Canal and parallel to the Suez Canal...We watched them build high ramparts to cover areas on our side previously obscured to them...We observed them practising river crossings...and breaching barriers with water jets...And we thought:...the fact that they are training in our presence shows that they have no serious intentions.⁷⁰

Egyptian Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) reinforced the mistaken Israeli belief that Arabs were inept and that their equipment was poorly maintained.⁷¹

When the Egyptians attacked in October 1973, they achieved complete surprise. All of the indicators for war were present, yet the Israeli government discounted them and continued to consider the Egyptians incapable of crossing the Suez. In Israel's opinion, such a crossing required engineering skills far beyond those of the Egyptian Army.⁷²

The Egyptian deception plan correctly targeted Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir as the decision maker. She received reassuring information from the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and from Defense Minister Moyshe Dayan, the hero of the 1967 war. The Egyptians took advantage of the Israeli superiority complex and fed that attitude to the point of Israeli overconfidence. This followed

the guidance of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart to confirm suspicions already present in the enemy's mind. Initially, the Egyptians made no attempt at security. They needed the Israelis to witness their exercises in order to lull them into a state of complacency. Security, however, echoed the tenets of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz after men and equipment were left hiding along the canal.

Preparation was detailed and convincing: an Egyptian demobilization was announced the week prior to the invasion. When the war began, decoy Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites were constructed and manned. The overall concept of the deception operation was the product of Anwar Sadat's mind. It was he who controlled and coordinated the operation, thus following the guidance for centralized control first laid down by Sun Tzu.

What commonalities exist among these examples? Napoleon, in his capacity as a head of state, exercised centralized control and coordination of the deception operation, as did Churchill and Sadat. As advocated by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart, each of the deception operations involved meticulous planning. None were planned as an afterthought. Napoleon's deception required the shortest amount of planning time, but even it took almost three weeks to bring to fruition. Liddell Hart stressed the need for deception to contain enough truth to be believable. Each of the deception operations examined was logical and confirmed suspicions already present in the enemy's mind. The target of the deception, as pointed out by all three theorists, was the enemy decision maker. In some cases, that individual was the opposing head of state; in other instances, it was the enemy commander. In the situation of World War II Germany, Adolf Hitler filled both roles. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz highlighted the importance of security in deception operations. In each of the examples discussed, security was adhered to rigorously. Having examined deception theory and history, we will now analyze the current deception doctrine

of the U.S. Army to determine *what* lessons have been learned from the past and *how*, if at all, those lessons have been incorporated into our doctrine.

A LOOK AT DOCTRINE

History indicates that successful deception operations assimilated theoretical tenets into their planning. What of the U.S. Army's current deception doctrine? Does it reflect the same theories and lessons derived from historical experience? Our base deception doctrine is FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception. FM 100-5, Operations, is the U.S. Army's doctrine for the conduct of war. Before looking at FM 90-2, it is instructive to study FM 100-5 to determine where deception fits into the army's concept of war.

FM 100-5 begins its discussion of deception by stating authoritatively that the deception plan is an integral part of any campaign plan or major operation.⁷³ Our brief survey of history demonstrates that it was an integral part of the campaigns of Napoleon, World War II, and the Yom Kippur War. FM 100-5, in fact, uses the examples of Operation Fortitude and the Yom Kippur War to buttress its assertion concerning the importance of deception.

The doctrine continues by declaring that "a sound deception plan is simple, believable...(and) targeted against the enemy commander who has the freedom of action to respond appropriately."⁷⁴ These points echo the teachings of Liddell Hart that deception plans must contain a modicum of truth. They also reaffirm the tenets of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart that the deception target must be the enemy decision maker with the ability to influence enemy actions.

FM 100-5 also observes that forcing the enemy to change his plan is highly problematic. The deception planner should instead attempt to convince the enemy that his preferred course of action is correct.⁷⁵ This breathes the ideas of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart. Mincemeat and Fortitude succeeded because they confirmed what Hitler wanted to believe concerning Allied intentions. General Mack was duped because Napoleon presented him with a target that seemed to confirm the Austrian's suspicions. The Israelis were surprised because the

Egyptians portrayed themselves as lazy and ill-prepared—just as the Israelis thought. The influence of Clausewitz is evident when FM 100-5 discusses deception as a means to achieve surprise.⁷⁶ Clausewitz saw deception as a component of surprise and our doctrine follows that lead, indirectly subordinating deception to surprise.

The FM 100-5 discussion of deception resonates with theory concerning logic, the deception target, and the need to reinforce preconceived enemy ideas. It addresses the need for deception security in its discussion of protection.⁷⁷ Security is also one of the principles of war. The doctrine states that "unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective."⁷⁸ It follows that such unity of command for deception operations falls under Sun Tzu's and Liddell Hart's call for centralized control and coordination. Although FM 100-5 does not specifically address the preparation of deception plans, it consistently reiterates the necessity for all planning to be simple, precise, and thorough.

FM 100-5 is our warfighting doctrine and emphasizes the same deception tenets discussed by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart. It also recognizes the practical application of those tenets in history. Since FM 100-5 is our capstone warfighting manual, all other U.S. Army planning literature should support that doctrine.

Deception is a component of operations and FM 90-2 recognizes its responsibility to support our warfighting doctrine. It clearly states that the objective of battlefield deception is "...to induce the enemy decision makers to take operational or tactical actions which are favorable to, and exploitable by, friendly combat operations."⁷⁹ Deception operations are designed to help establish favorable conditions for friendly campaigns.

Our deception doctrine establishes its "raison d'être" by using history to demonstrate the effectiveness of deception. With history to buttress its argument, FM 90-2 chastises commanders for neglecting deception when planning and conducting combat operations and exercises.⁸⁰

The doctrine highlights several deception maxims. Although anecdotal in nature, many of the maxims reflect lessons from theory and history examined earlier in this paper. First among these maxims is "Magruder's Principles." Essentially, this maxim is the idea of exploiting enemy perceptions.⁸¹ This concept is in line with the theories of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart to confirm enemy suspicions. It was witnessed in Napoleon's deception of General Mack, and the Allies' deception of Hitler at both Sicily and Normandy.

"Limitations to Human Information Processing" is the next maxim addressed. The key limitation is that any inference drawn from too small a sample is invariably erroneous.⁸² This maxim is evident in the Normandy invasion. Given the poor weather conditions, the Germans assumed that the Allies would not attack on 6 June 1944. The basis for their assumption was that the Allies had not previously conducted amphibious assaults in bad weather. Additionally, Allied air attacks destroyed German weather stations, so they had no way of predicting the brief weather respite that occurred.⁸³

The "Cry Wolf" maxim, that of repeated false alarms, is most clearly seen in the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973.⁸⁴ The Israelis, as studied previously, were lulled into a false sense of security by repeated Egyptian training exercises.

The maxim to provide "A Choice Among Types of Deception" refers to the distinction between ambiguity and misdirection.⁸⁵ This concept harkens back to the theory of Liddell Hart that a deception plan should contain enough truth to be logical to the enemy. It also reminds one that Allied confidence in the German

"Abwehr" was so low that a concerted effort was made to provide enough data to ensure that the Germans formed the picture desired by the Allies.

The idea of withholding deception assets until the critical moment is the maxim known as "Axelrod's Contribution: The Husbanding of Assets."⁸⁶ This reflects the tenet of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart concerning thorough preparation of deception plans. The British captured German spies during the course of World War II and converted them to double agents. None, however, were used until preparation began for the Normandy invasion.⁸⁷

"A Sequencing Rule" is the maxim to keep the deception plan operative as long as possible.⁸⁸ Remember that Operation Fortitude North, the supposed Allied invasion of Scandinavia, preceded Fortitude South, the expected assault at the Pas de Calais. Such sequencing is possible because of thorough preparation. The success of the maxims discussed thus far has been dependent on correctly targeting the enemy decision maker. FM 90-2, in line with FM 100-5, shows its clear support of this concept by stating that "the target of battlefield deception operations is the enemy decision maker."⁸⁹

The last deception maxim, called "The Monkey's Paw," highlights the principle of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz concerning the paramount importance of security in deception planning.⁹⁰ Security of this magnitude was evident in the control that Napoleon, Churchill, and Sadat exercised over the media to hide their true intentions.

Our deception doctrine further demonstrates its support of FM 100-5 by pointing out that deception permits us to create surprise. Having accomplished this, we are then able to seize the initiative by doing the unexpected and inducing the target to react to our operations. The ability to orchestrate these actions depends heavily on our ability to synchronize deception and operations plans.⁹¹

After discussing deception in general terms, FM 90-2 turns to deception at the operational level of war. As is true at the tactical level, the objective of operational level deception is to influence the decisions of the enemy commander.⁹² One method of attaining that goal is to identify and weaken the enemy's source of power, his center of gravity. This is achieved by developing deceptions around the branches and sequels to campaign plans. Because deception will divert the enemy commander's attention, he will be unable to concentrate solely on his center of gravity. Deceptions planned in this way are thus thoroughly integrated into the operations plan, are logical, and have a focal point. The use of branches and sequels in deception operations is one of the major themes of our doctrine's discussion of operational deception. "Preplanned branches to the campaign plan...are the fertile soil into which the seeds of deception can be sown...Deceptions can be as effectively woven around preplanned sequel variants as branch variants."⁹³ The beauty of using branches and sequels as deceptions is that in so doing the planner makes use of courses of action that are operationally sound, appear logical to the enemy decision maker, and could, if necessary, be executed.

Another area for the use of operational deception is the sustainment arena. FM 90-2 discusses the use of notional sustainment bases and Lines of Communication (LOC).⁹⁴ If properly planned, such notional entities can divert enemy resources that would otherwise be used against the true sustainment facilities. These ideas remind one of Sun Tzu and his theory to use shapes and delusions to deceive the enemy.

In its chapter dedicated to deception planning, FM 90-2 leaves no doubt that the operations officer of a staff, not the intelligence officer, is responsible for deception planning.⁹⁵ This is further recognition that deception is an integral part of operations and should not be treated as an adjunct to the operational

scheme. In short, deceptions cannot be planned in a vacuum; to be logical and effective, they must be part of the operation from the beginning.

The doctrine then offers a five step process for planning deception. Briefly, the steps are: 1) Situation analysis of both friendly and enemy situations, along with a study of the deception target; 2) Deception objective formulation that determines what the enemy must do or fail to do in order for the friendly deception to achieve success; 3) Desired perception that must be created in the enemy's mind to make him act; 4) Deception story that will cause the enemy to form the desired perception; 5) Deception plan or how the story will be conveyed.⁹⁶

In its discussion of deception at the operational level, FM 90-2 includes the necessity for operational deception plans to support strategic deceptions.⁹⁷ Deception plans, like all plans, must be coordinated with other affected headquarters to ensure that they are mutually supportive. The accomplishment of this goal implies a need for the centralized control and coordination postulated by Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart. Deception plans must also be coordinated with other staff members for development of means to execute the plan, as well as the impact that the deception plan will have on other staff estimates. The necessity for coordination is evident. The doctrine's proposed planning steps suggest the need for thorough preparation and security, in addition to the requirement that the deception be logical and target the enemy decision maker.

Having developed a deception planning process, FM 90-2 examines the techniques by which the plan may be implemented. The four techniques studied are feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays. Napoleon's use of the reserve cavalry corps in the Black Forest was a feint; planting false information on the body of Major William Martin in Operation Mincemeat was a ruse. Egypt's use of decoy positions in crossing the Suez Canal was a form of demonstration, while

the portrayal of FUSAG as the primary Allied invasion force in 1944 was a display. It should be noted that these techniques relied on visual contact by the enemy. Deception can be equally effective when used electronically. Recall that the British used imaginative means to deceive German radar during Fortitude South.

In FM 100-5 and FM 90-2, we find emphasis on the deception tenets of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart. Both doctrinal manuals also use history to illustrate those tenets. FM 90-2 strives to support the operational warfighting concepts of FM 100-5. Additionally, it provides a framework for the development of a deception plan. If the doctrine includes the tenets of theory and the lessons of history, why is deception planning frequently ignored at the operational level? Are changes needed in the planning process? If so, what changes will enhance the planning and execution of deception planning at the operational level of war? These questions will be examined in the next section.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After reviewing deception theories and historical examples of operational deception, we examined the U.S. Army's current deception doctrine and found that it essentially reflects lessons from both. Michael Handel, in Deception in World War II, wrote that "the art of deception can only be cultivated and learned through history, the experience of one's contemporaries, and the encouragement of creativity and imagination in the military."⁹⁸ In World War II, the United States experienced, firsthand, the value of deception. Still, deception planning is often treated as a sideshow during exercises. Such disinterest by commanders trickles down through a staff, often resulting in deception that is done for deception's sake without any supporting operational purpose.

Why does the U.S. Army find deception distasteful? From a practical standpoint, many feel it too risky to give the enemy accurate information concerning friendly forces for the sake of a deception whose results are frequently difficult to measure. When one considers that commanders must constantly juggle limited resources and that deception cannot replace men or materiel, this attitude becomes understandable. It ignores, however, the reality that "nothing in the history of warfare since 1945 suggests that the importance of deception has declined."⁹⁹ Recent Allied operations in the Persian Gulf reinforce the significance of operational deception. As the U.S. Army enters an era of dwindling resources, the importance of deception will increase. Innovative, well planned deception can help offset cuts in equipment and personnel by continuing to portray our current levels of strength. Smaller budgets will necessitate a more efficient use of available resources. Effective deception plans will be essential if campaigns are to avoid telegraphing their intentions to the enemy. It is worthwhile to remember that Iraq, during its eight year war with Iran, used deception to great advantage. In recent operations against the Allied

coalition, Iraq painted airfields to make them appear damaged and hid missiles in fake mosques.¹⁰⁰

These types of activities harken back to the theories of Sun Tzu concerning the use of shapes to deceive the enemy. They also point to the reality that "human nature cannot be expected to change; and since most deception operations are designed to reinforce the existing beliefs and perceptions of the deceived, successful deception will continue to be an important factor in war."¹⁰¹ Because human nature plays a key role in activities of this nature, it is imperative that deception planners see things from the enemy's viewpoint. That is possible if the planner learns to think like his adversary. Understanding the enemy's thought processes requires excellent analysis of intelligence and diligent study of the opponent.

Our society's moral philosophy and religious teachings may prevent us from instinctively embracing the art of deception.¹⁰² This attitude notwithstanding, the very openness of our society is double-edged. Although our open society may prevent us from instinctively thinking about deception, our enemies may see this as a vulnerability and tend to relax their guard to our use of deception. Such relaxation aids our deception efforts simply because the enemy thinks we are incapable of planning and executing effective deception. The resulting paradox is that "the more one has a reputation for honesty - the easier it is to lie convincingly." ¹⁰³

Clausewitz noted that deception is more appealing to a weaker force than to one that is strong.¹⁰⁴ A caveat can be added that deception is equally appealing when the enemy situation is unclear or when the commander desires to minimize casualties. The former was seen in Fortitude South, while the latter was evident in the Desert Storm operation in the Persian Gulf. Strong states often assume that victory is assured and rarely use deception.¹⁰⁵ In 1973, the

Israelis experienced the fallacy of a superiority complex that prevented proper planning. Planning in the U.S. Army frequently demonstrates similar shortcomings. Too often, commanders and staffs concentrate on a single course of action instead of multiple, but related courses of action.

These reasons for misusing or ignoring deception planning do not change the basic fact that our doctrine is essentially sound, but underutilized. Let us review our criteria for effective deception planning. Such planning:

1. Requires centralized control and coordination.
2. Is possible only with thorough preparation.
3. Must be logical.
4. Should confirm suspicions already present in the enemy's mind.
5. Targets the enemy decision maker.
6. Maintain security.

The U.S. Army has, in recent years, made efforts to revitalize deception planning. In 1989, in an effort to bring deception planning to the forefront, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) transferred proponentcy for deception from the Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona to the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.¹⁰⁶ This move was also tacit recognition that military deception exists to support military operations.

Deception is a function of operations and intelligence, but the operational side must take the lead in its planning. It is significant that the Army did not shift proponentcy to either the Armor or Infantry Schools, maneuver branches habitually associated with operations. By giving deception proponentcy to CAC, TRADOC signalled that a central controlling and coordinating headquarters is required to ensure that deception is part of the Army's overall operations doctrine. A shift in proponentcy does not mean deception is solely an operations function. Intelligence is critical to determining the enemy's mind-set. As with all planning, deception must be fully coordinated with all staff members. The shift in

proponency also does not absolve TRADOC schools of the responsibility to incorporate deception planning into their respective curricula. By inculcating deception's value into its education process, the Army can develop leaders who understand that deception is more than a subsidiary function.

Deception planning is complex and often resource intensive. While such things as decoys are simple and often effective, the plan for their use will normally be very detailed. Planning a deception without adequate resources runs the risk of being transparent to the enemy and wasting valuable assets. Thorough preparation of deception plans requires an understanding of the operational commander's plan. The important question underlying deception planning is "...what do you want the enemy to *do*? and never what do you want him to *think*."¹⁰⁷ The ultimate goal of preparation is to change the enemy's behavior, not his attitude. Preparation of this sort was a major tenet of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Liddell Hart. The meticulous level of detail evident in the plans for Operations Mincemeat and Fortitude South are testimony to the validity of their theory.

Deception that is not well planned will be apparent to the enemy and useless to the friendly commander. Deception operations can be of significant benefit to commanders if they acquire an importance of their own and pose a real threat to the enemy.¹⁰⁸ Liddell Hart determined that deception plans must contain enough truth to appear logical to the enemy. Deception plans should support the operations plan *and* pose a viable threat in their own right. Operations Fortitude North and South, as well as Operation Zeppelin, were plausible operations plans that could not be ignored by the Germans. FM 90-2 emphasizes the use of branches and sequels as deceptions because they are realistic enough that they must be considered by enemy planners.

Based on his intelligence reports, the enemy will be predisposed to certain beliefs about friendly operations. Deception plans should aim to reinforce those beliefs. Remember that the goal is to change the enemy's behavior and not his attitude. Most successful deception operations do not try to change the perceptions of the intended victims - they instead reinforce and capitalize on his existing perceptions.¹⁰⁹ Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart spoke of the need to reinforce the enemy's preconceived notions. This goal was evident in each of the historical examples we examined and is a major tenet of our deception doctrine. A deception plan that is thoroughly planned and based on enemy suspicions already present will be more likely to appear logical to the enemy decision maker.

The enemy decision maker must be the deception target. Persons of lesser stature may influence the enemy hierarchy, but only one individual can decide enemy policy and action. That individual may be, as we have seen, the head of state and, on occasion, the military commander.

The need to maintain security is evident in all successful deceptions. In discussing British deception planning in World War II, Dennis Wheatley wrote that MI 5 decided early in the war that "as few people as possible should be allowed to know the deception plan."¹¹⁰ In an age of "You Are There" media coverage, it is tempting to believe that deception security is impractical. It is instructive, however, to remember that Winston Churchill frequently approved deception plans that fooled both enemy and friendly press corps and military units.

The previously listed criteria, while not a panacea, provide a constructive tool for planning deception at the operational level of war. Campaign plans, while broad in nature, are ideally suited for integrated deception planning. Such planning should be centrally controlled. To ensure coordination, deception planning should become part of the staff estimate process. In this way, it is

considered throughout the totality of the staff and does not become a mere adjunct to the operations plan.

Thorough preparation is as critical to deception plans as it is to operations, logistics, or any other plans. Meticulous attention to detail will allow us to use technology to our benefit in planning deception. Technology expands the potential of deception in the areas of electronics and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Electronic deception becomes increasingly important in campaigns that are so reliant on radios and digital information.

The phased nature of campaigns fits neatly with the goal of having deceptions that are sequential and that support the operations plan. Use of a campaign's branches, sequels, and logistics plan for deception operations helps the deception appear logical. Because branches, sequels, and logistics plans are executable in their own right, they enhance the preconceived ideas of the enemy decision maker. At the operational level, advanced technology may prevent the secret massing of forces, but the enemy can be deceived by the location and composition of sustainment bases. Knowing that large formations are inextricably linked to their logistics centers, the enemy will look for a sustainment build-up to ascertain the friendly line of operation. By building notional sustainment bases, it may be possible to deceive the enemy long enough that he is unable to react in a timely manner. Under such conditions, operational surprise can be achieved.

Absolute planning security will increase the effectiveness and potential payoff of the deception plan. By extension, the chances for operational success will also increase. These criteria, then, provide a framework for enhancing the planning of operational deception. Theory, history, and doctrine demonstrate the value of deception as a force multiplier. Even in an age of satellite technology, "...deception will always remain an integral part of all military activity."¹¹

Although our current military doctrine draws heavily from Clausewitz, it is important that we heed the lessons of other theorists as well. In the field of deception, Sun Tzu's teachings may be more applicable than those of Clausewitz. Sun Tzu recognized that practical deception is limited only by the imagination of the planners. "If Sun Tzu were alive today he might conclude that the pluralistic and democratic governments of the West are the ones susceptible to the art of warfare as he envisioned it."¹¹² To avoid being deceived, one must first understand how to deceive. Our deception doctrine is sound and firmly rooted in theory and history. It is, however, grossly underutilized. The U.S. Army must teach and train deception planning at each stage of a leader's development. For our use of operational deception, it is necessary to influence behavior and attitude. In so doing, we can ensure the continued effective planning of deception first employed by Joshua against the army of Ai.

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